By David Braddon-Mitchell, Robert Nola
A brand new software of philosophical research that reconciles a undeniable account of research with philosophical naturalism is utilized to more than a few philosophical concerns.
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Extra info for Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism (Bradford Books)
Thus the idea is that though we never had the explicit idea that ‘water is the actual, local water stuff’ we were able to respond to Kripke’s Twin Earth thought experiments. Confronted with a case where some water substance exists elsewhere in the actual world (or confronted with similar counterfactual cases) we have access to the judgment that given what we mean by the term ‘water’, that other substance is not water. This thought is central to the Canberra Plan, and is part of how the apparently heartland examples of a posteriori semantics are subsumed into the a priori and analytic.
But here we come to the crunch. What is it that we grasp when we appear to grasp what seem to be different metaphysical hypotheses, and we appear to understand the difference between them? If they are metaphysical hypotheses that go beyond the empirical, we should think that one of these three conditions holds: (1) All of the hypotheses are internally contradictory, and if we appear to grasp differences between them, then these are not intensional differences— they are not different hypotheses about how things might be.
Of course we have to be careful to put it that way: it shouldn’t be put as how the truth of claims about what’s necessary affects the space of worlds and how we should label them. For only one of the various two-dimensional tables we might draw given different suppositions about what is necessary or contingent actually does describe the space of worlds at all, and how we should label the things in the worlds. But each corresponds to a set of complex linguistic and cognitive dispositions, to a mental state that can, in a neutral sort of way, be adopted (and allowed to run) or not.
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism (Bradford Books) by David Braddon-Mitchell, Robert Nola